It has been said that the principle underlying Lumley v Gye is that a 'violation of legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action' (Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 at 510, per Lord Macnaghten, see para [1675] below). The question has been raised whether the principle applies not only to the claimant's primary right to the performance of his contract, but also to his secondary right to a remedy for non-performance. The answer is no, or at least not as such or not usually (Law Debenture Trust Corpn plc v Ural Caspian Oil Corpn Ltd [1995] Ch 152, [1995] 1 All ER 157, CA), but it is thought that it is unnecessarily misleading to put the question in that form.
The categorisation of rights into a primary right (to performance) and a secondary right (to a remedy